Methods against methods by Stierand, Marc & Dörfler, Viktor
Stierand, Marc and Dörfler, Viktor (2011) Methods against methods. In: 
Technology for Creativity and Innovation Tools, Techniques and 
Applications. IGI Global, Hershey, pp. 121-134. ISBN 9781609605193 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60960-519-3.ch006
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/28004/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Methods against Methods 
Marc Stierand 
NHTV Breda University of Applied Sciences, the Netherlands 
Viktor Dörfler 
University of Strathclyde, United Kingdom 
Keywords:  methods; creativity; innovation; problem-solving; systems view; lateral 
thinking; extraordinariness; master level knowledge; 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter intends to clarify some issues about the often misunderstood terminology of 
creativity and innovation methods. Following the train of thought outlined in this chapter, it is 
argued that neither creativity nor innovation is guided by a method. There are only methods 
against methods that can help the extraordinary individual to step faster and easier into a state 
of mind that is conducive to creativity, but which has no effect on whether the creative output 
becomes an innovation. In order to support this claim, three major reasons that seem to be 
responsible for making people believe that such methods for creativity and innovation exist are 
outlined here. Next, the chapter addresses the phenomenon of creativity and continues with a 
discussion on the systemic character of creativity and innovation. Finally it shows that there are 
no methods for creativity, but methods against non-creativity by explaining in particular how 
one of these methods against non-creativity works. What this chapter outlines here is a 
necessarily one-sided and partial view, aiming not to convince the readers of the correctness of 
the view, but rather to make them think by presenting one possible consistent approach. 
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
Are there steps that, when followed, lead not only to a new idea (i.e. creativity), but also to a 
successful idea (i.e. innovation)? We do not think that there are, but we think that there are 
methods against methods that can help the creative individual to step faster and easier into a 
state of mind that is conducive to creativity. But there is still no connection to innovation, 
because whether an idea becomes an innovation is not decided by the creative individual, but, 
as we shall see later, by the perceptive value of this idea. 
Outside the academic world innovation is often seen as enigma, as the work of a creative 
genius or as serendipity. However, this view is mostly dismissed by academics as unscientific, 
because its validity is very difficult to test. Therefore, academia has created a preference for 
seeing innovation as a continuous, rational, and purposive process (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Rogers, 1962). Researchers interested in innovation often apply micro perspectives and 
frequently seem to be lost in thought trying to answer questions of explanation, prediction, 
and correspondence. This has led to a lack of understanding about the phenomenology of 
innovation, which we see as the foundation on which any explanation, prediction and 
correspondence should be built. Moreover, there is still the problem that we have to deal with 
creativity when we engage with the topic of innovation. Although many researchers 
acknowledge the link between creativity and in- novation, they just close creativity into a black 
box or go around in circles by trying to blueprint the creative process. 
The problem about creativity is that we know it exists, but we do not know how it works. In 
other words, we do not know what the creative process looks like. We have never seen it. We 
ŚĂǀĞ ŽŶůǇ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ Ă ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ŶŽƚŚĞƌ
widespread issue is linked to the creative individual. Many people think that everyone can be 
creative. But if this would be the case, why are there so few DŽǌĂƌƚ ?ƐĂŶĚ ^ ŚĂŬĞƐƉĞĂƌĞ ?Ɛ ?Our 
Western and postmodern society tends to equate equality with sameness and thereby 
neglects the creative extraordinariness of a few. Our society does not welcome outliers. In fact, 
we even cut off these tall poppies, because their talents naturally distinguish them from the 
rest of us. People can be equal, but they are not the same. Not everyone can paint like Matisse 
and not everyone can write like Goethe. Even if one could prove that all people start with the 
same genetic makeup for creativity from birth, not everyone will be able or will have the 
chance to develop a creative ability that can produce creations of the quality and influence as 
those of the aforementioned masters. 
In order to support our arguments, we are going to outline our understanding of creativity 
and innovation and show how both phenomena are linked. Based on this outline we focus on 
the creative individual. We ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĚƌĂǁŽŶ'ĂƌĚŶĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌŝŶĞƐƐŝŶ 
order to illustrate that creating something new and valuable requires an individual with 
substantial knowledge and not just the ability to enter a state of mind that is conducive to 
creativity. Then we expand our discussion to the phenomenon of innovation by showing that 
innovations are not produced solely by an individual but require the socio-cultural world for 
validation and co-creation of the new value. At the end we look at de ŽŶŽ ?Ɛwork on creativity 
methods. 
What we want to present in this essay is our approach to creativity and innovation. This is a 
necessarily partial and one-ƐŝĚĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ũƵƐƚĂƐĂŶǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?Ɛ ?ŽŶǀĞƌƐĞůǇ ?ǁĞĚŽŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌ
a comprehensive literature review; we are only covering the literature necessary to outline 
our position. Specifically, we do not engage with the issues of team dynamics, thus we 
disregard the sources aimed at encouraging creativity in organization and facilitating teams 
regardless whether those are supposed to be creative teams or not. We also limit our study of 
creativity to extraordinary performance; we do not engage with the creativity of people at 
below-expert knowledge level. Our argument is not directed towards a particular method or 
groups of methods, but rather we are questioning the idea of having methods for 
creativity/innovation. Thus this paper does not include description or comparison of various 
methods. There is one exception to this, a group of methods baring specific relevance to our 
argument; this group is outlined briefly to support understanding. We do not aim at convincing 
the readers that this is the only right way to address creativity and innovation, only that this 
is one possible way. By doing so, we would like to make the readers think more deeply about 
creativity and innovation. However, before doing so it is necessary to explain what we mean 
by creativity. 
UNDERSTANDING CREATIVITY 
Let us start explaining creativity through the notion of problem solving. Simon (1973) 
distinguished between ill-structured and well-structured problems and regards the first as a 
residual concept, which means that a problem is ill-structured when it is not well-structured. An 
ill-structured problem is one that is deficiently defined, whereas a well-structured problem 
possesses some or all of the following characteristics (Simon, 1973: 183): 
1. There exist definite criteria to test the solution; 
2. The initial problem state, the goal state and all intermediate states may be 
represented; 
3. The transitions between the previous states can be represented; 
4. The acquired knowledge can be represented; 
5. The effects of the environment can be represented; 
6. And a feasible amount of search and computing is required; 
Simon, however, admitted that his proposed criteria for well-structured problems are vague 
and not completely definite, because there are many shades of definiteness along the way 
between ill- structured and well-structured problems. People were always fascinated by the 
idea of ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ Žf explanations in which they believe they can find the 
answer to how the human mind works. In the 17th century, for example, the great French 
mathematician and philosopher René Descartes tried to find a universal method to solve 
problems. But, as Pólya (1957) remarks, Descartes failed to understand how the human mind 
solves problems in the first place. Over 300 years later Simon took on Descartes challenge and 
tried for most of his career to build what he called a General Problem Solver (GPS). The working 
principle of the GPS is very sensible: find what is identical in all problems, the common part, 
and use this as the base and then you only need to sort out the details that make the difference 
(e.g. Newell & Simon, 1972). This is sensible in principle. But can you tell what the common 
part is in finding a cure for cancer and making great paella? Nothing has changed since 
Descartes, and we still do not know how the mind solves problems and especially ill-structured 
ones. The only thing we know is that the same in all ill-structured problem-solving is that the 
problem-solver sees things differently from how they are usually seen. In other words, the 
problem is solved through creativity. The reasons why we still do not know how the mind uses 
creativity, is simply because the part of thinking, which is responsible for seeing things 
differently, is non-algorithmic. This means that this part of thinking cannot be put into a finite 
sequence of instructions for solving a problem. De Bono (1971, 1994) calls this non- 
algorithmic part of thinking lateral thinking or sometimes parallel thinking. The notion of lateral 
thinking can be easily grasped through explaining how good jokes work (Baracskai, 1998). In 
good jokes the joke teller takes us on a vertical way of thinking. Something like: 
A man and a friend are playing golf one day at their local golf course. One of 
the guys is about to chip onto the green when he sees a long funeral procession 
on the road next to the course. He stops in mid-swing, takes off his golf cap, 
closes his eyes, and bows down in prayer. 
This vertical way sets us on a way towards the obvious conclusion: probably the man stops 
playing golf, because he wants to be respectful towards the mourners. This is the essence of 
vertical thinking; there is a single outcome and the thinking converges towards it. But in a joke 
there is a jump out from the vertical storyline into a lateral direction. The obvious is rearranging 
to form a new order, to make new sense when we get to the punch line. In our example the friend 
says: 
 ?tŽǁ ?that is the most thoughtful and touching thing I have ever seen. You 
truly are a kind ŵĂŶ ? ?dŚĞŵĂŶƚŚĞŶƌĞƉůŝĞƐ P ?zĞĂŚ ?well we were married 35 
ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?
If there were to be no new order it would not be a joke. Nobody would laugh. The reason why 
we laugh is because we understand that there is another way of thinking according to which 
the punch line is perfectly logical. It makes sense, but we would not have thought of it. We have 
now seen that creativity is highly anti-ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŶ&ĞǇĞƌĂďĞŶĚ ?Ɛ(1993) sense and the 
new, ƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚĞƐƵƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐƵƐůĂƵŐŚ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐƵƐƐĂǇ “ǁŚǇĚŝĚ/ŶŽƚ
ƚŚŝŶŬŽĨƚŚĂƚďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ? ?ŝƐĂůĂƚĞƌĂůĚĞƚŽƵƌ ?/Ŷ other words, it is a discontinuity, a sudden change 
that is not usual in the given situation and that shows no obvious connection between the 
factors under consideration (de Bono, 1971). But with hindsight, and that might be the reason 
why people think that there are steps to produce new ideas, the lateral thinking is logical, 
which means that the new solution is obvious. However, there is again bad news for those 
who think that we should just do a bit of reverse engineering and follow back the lateral route 
to blueprint the steps the creator or joke teller took to see how creativity works. But 
unfortunately we have no evidence that the later explanation reflects the way how the creator 
or joke teller got to the novelty (Gladwell, 2005). Of course, saying that creativity is about 
seeing things differently, does not mean seeing in any different way. Only in ways that make 
sense, just no one has seen it before. Hadamard (1954), for example, investigated how new 
results are born in the field of mathematics, which is usually thought of as being completely 
logical. His investigation showed, among other things, that the creator requires deep 
knowledge and that the novelty is born in a flash of intuition. According to Hadamard, the first 
phase is the conscious hard work of trying to solve a problem followed by a kind of forgetting 
phase, which is a sort of unconscious continuation of the work. After that phase comes the 
sudden insight accompanied by a sense of certainty. At the end the mathematician proves the 
result on paper in full consciousness. We now have a reasonably solid explanation why there 
can be no methods for being creative: First, the creative jump cannot be seen in advance, but 
only retrospectively. And second, an algorithm cannot go into a place that cannot be seen. This 
is only possible through imagination and intuition. We now continue to outline the systemic 
character of creativity and innovation by referring to the link between creativity and 
innovation, the creatives, and idea creation and value creation. These aspects, as we will show, 
are reasons why we cannot apply steps for creativity and innovation. 
THE SYSTEMIC CHARACTER OF CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
The Link between Creativity and Innovation 
Csíkszentmihályi (1997, 2006) speaks of two types of creativity: Creativity (with a capital C) 
and creativity (with a lower case c) as can be seen in the following figure. Creativity (with a 
capital C) is a system of three interrelated parts: the domain, the field, and the individual. The 
domain is the area in which the individual has chosen to work. Each domain has its specific 
rules, knowledge, tools, practices and values. The field, on the other hand, consists of the 
persons and institutions that judge the individual ĐƌĞĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ quality of work. In other words, the 
field consists of the gatekeepers to the domain. The individual creator, in contrast, is influenced 
by her/his personal creativity (that is creativity with a lower case c) and by her/his specific 
genetic makeup, talent and experience (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: A Systems Model of Creativity. Source: Csíkszentmihályi (2006: 4) 
Hence, Creativity is concerned with changing or transforming an existing domain, whereas 
creativity is concerned with the actions or thoughts of a creative person that have the power 
to change or transform an existing domain. In other words, creativity is concerned with the 
creation of a new idea and Creativity is concerned with realizing a new value, that is, the 
successful innovation from the idea. This link between creativity and innovation can be 
expressed as a two stage heuristic process. The first stage is a creative process of solving an 
ill-structured problem in which the problem solver rearranges her/his existing knowledge in 
order to obtain a solution for the problem (Dörfler, 2004). The validation of the idea happens 
then in the network of gatekeepers. The second stage is concerned with how the idea is 
converted into a value. The validation of the new value is then executed by the field, which 
actually co-creates the value by promoting it to the domain (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Heuristic Process of Innovation. Source: own figure 
Going back about one century to the beginnings of innovation research tells us that the 
interest in innovation actually emerged from diverse branches within the social sciences. 
While these branches applied different background knowledge, they had the common 
intention to describe and give reasons for social changes. Anthropologists like Alfred Kroeber 
(1876-1960) and Ralph Linton (1883-1953), for example, explored cross-cultural diffusions of 
technical and social practices, which they called borrowing inventions. And sociologists like 
William Ogburn (1886-1959) explained social change as continuous cultural lag. The economist 
Joseph Schumpeter (1911, 1939, 1947), however, is certainly acknowledged by many as the 
initiator of innovation research. He derived his ideas about innovation from his analysis of 
economic and social systems and many believe that his thoughts gave the impetus to recognize 
innovation as the crucial factor for economic progress and change. In his early work, he 
ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƐŝǌĞaffects its ability to innovate and therefore smaller companies, 
while being more flexible, seem to be better positioned to innovate than larger and more 
bureaucratic companies. Later, though, he suspected that larger companies, in particular 
those with a monopolistic market power, might be better positioned to innovate than smaller 
firms, because of their power and because they often have better resources. Fundamentally, he 
saw innovations as waves of creative destruction that can revolutionize a whole market. This 
view challenged the status quo of capitalism at the time, because it rejected the view that 
capital- ism is about managing its existing structures and proposed that it actually is about 
destroying its existing structures in order to create new ones. This also meant that firms that 
can respond fast enough and can take hold of discontinuities are better positioned that firms 
that have difficulties to do so. Hence, innovation is therefore not the response to a well-
structured problem for which we are able to apply exact criteria that we can test and neither 
new idea
new knowledge
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can we blueprint each single phase of the innovation process. Approaches that try to make us 
believe that this is possible just create an artificially validated process under a condition that 
Bessant and Caffyn (1997) termed continuous innovation. Under this condition, innovation is 
nothing more than a process of improvement that takes place in a framework of existing and 
known rules. Simply said, continuous innovation means doing things as usual, only better. This 
does not exclude significant changes but implies that changes occur within an established 
framework. Of course, continuous innovation is already a complex phenomenon, but research 
cannot ignore that innovation can also be influenced by discontinuous and chaotic conditions. 
Discontinuity can be a scary notion, because it is not an everyday event. Innovators are forced 
to experiment in order to accumulate new knowledge that can help them to keep track in an 
unpredictable world. During times of experimentation a so-called dominant design emerges 
that in some way predicts the most popular but not necessarily the most sophisticated 
trajectory of the future. The old trajectories, however, are still in place and normally undergo 
rapid improvements, which in turn sharpens the conditions for all actors. But many still see 
innovation as a linear and continuous process and argue that social (i.e. non-technological) and 
technological innovations are opposite ends of a continuum. Yet, social innovation just means 
that it is the result of accepting something new that changes the domain or creates a new 
domain. Consequently, every innovation, whether technological or non-technological, is also 
a social innovation, because the creative output has to pass social validation before it can 
become an innovation. This becomes obvious, if we look at how some great technical 
innovations that affected our lives. For instance, the first airplane was designed in 1903 but 
this had no effect on our lives whatsoever. The real impact of flying happened only in the 
1 ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ǁŚĞŶ we actually started to use airplanes to fly all over the world. We have now seen 
that innovation lies outside the influence of the creator, because it is a social validation of the 
ĐƌĞĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ idea. It is obvious that there cannot be a method for controlling this social validation. 
This raises interesting questions regarding the responsibility of the innovator and also of 
various social institutions, but we do not engage with these in this chapter. We have now seen 
that innovation lies outside the influence of the creator, because it is a social validation of the 
ĐƌĞĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ idea. It is obvious that there cannot be a method for controlling this social validation. 
This raises interesting questions regarding the responsibility of the innovator and also of 
various social institutions, but we do not engage with these in this chapter. 
dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ the literature to express a range of 
different ideas (Pol & Ville, 2009). Taylor and Gabor were probably the first who mentioned the 
term explicitly .As a behavioural scientist, Taylor (1970: 70) argued that social innovation is a 
response to social needs by introducing, for example, an  ?ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞŶĞǁƐĐŚŽŽů ?ĂŶĞǁǁĂǇ
of dealing with poverty, a new procedure for resocializing delinquents, a new technique for 
rehabilitating ƚŚĞƐĐŚŝǌŽƉŚƌĞŶŝĐ ? ?Gabor (1970), on the other hand, saw social innovation as a 
tool to stimulate new arrangements in society such as new technologies or laws. Since 1970 it 
seems that a headless chicken run started to add yet another definition of social innovation to 
the literature and very often without improving the understanding of the concept. We are great 
believers in going back to the origins and, indeed, Taylor teaches us that his understanding 
of social innovation really explains a specific type of innovation; one that is expected to disrupt 
valued roles, identities, and skills of high complexity. In other words, social innovations may 
enrage and put whole communities to the test. Taylor offers here the amusing contrast with 
the invention of a new and better mousetrap. A new mousetrap will most likely be accepted 
quite quickly given sufficient advertising and right distribution. The reason is that accepting a 
new mousetrap ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ ŶŽ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ Ă ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ Žƌ ůŝĨĞ ƐƚǇůĞ ? ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ a social 
innovation requires a radical and revolutionary change of values and beliefs. And we all know 
how difficult that is. 
After this detour into the social aspect of innovations, let us now look at the creatives 
themselves before we continue to discuss the topics of idea validation and value creation in 
detail. 
The Creatives 
Social psychologists have long argued for a link between extraordinary individuals and 
creativity (see e.g. Gardner, 1993; Guildford, 1950; Koestler, 1964; Osborn, 1953). More 
recently, however, they have begun suggesting that creativity is not exclusive to extraordinary 
individuals, but is a primary component of every human life. The problem is that situational 
factors, such as childhood and education, are very influential and finally decide whether a 
person is able to actualize on her/his creative potential. In other words, we face the same 
problem as earlier mentioned that, even if we assume that at birth all people start with the 
same genetic makeup for creativity, not everybody has the chance to exploit it. Gardner (1998: 
11-12) distinguishes between four main types of extraordinary people: the master, the maker, 
the introspector, and the influencer. For example, he describes Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart as a 
master who typically  ?ŐĂŝŶƐ complete mastery over one or more domains of accomplishment; 
ŚŝƐŽƌŚĞƌŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?Sigmund Freud represents the maker, 
because a  ?ŵĂŬĞƌŵĂǇŚĂǀĞŵĂƐƚĞƌĞĚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĚŽŵĂŝŶƐ ?ďƵƚŚĞŽƌƐŚĞĚĞǀŽƚĞƐĞŶĞƌŐŝĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĞǁĚŽŵĂŝŶ ? ?The introspector is represented by Virginia Woolf, because the 
 ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ŝƐ ĂŶ ĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ Žƌ ŚĞƌ ŝŶŶĞƌ ůŝĨĞ ? ?And finally 
Mahatma Gandhi embodies the influencer, who  ?ŚĂƐĂƐĂ primary goal the influencing of other 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ?Further, it is important to note, argues Gardner, that individuals may comprise 
more than one type of extraordinariness. What most extraordinary people have in common is 
that they have often failed dramatically, but they have the ability to reflect on their failures 
and learn from them in such a way that they were able to clearly identify their strengths, 
exploit them, and thus turn defeats into opportunities. These lessons can be nicely linked to 
^ĐŚƵŵƉĞƚĞƌ ?Ɛ description of the entrepreneur and the creative destroyer. For the early 
Schumpeter (1911) entrepreneurs were a small dynamic minority of agents that, in 
comparison to the rest of us, actively respond to changing environments and are able to 
create something new through overcoming internal and external resistance. This special breed 
of people, which Schumpeter (1947) later calls the creative destroyer, has the ability to 
successfully combine already available economic possibilities in completely new ways. Positive 
economic development is therefore achieved through innovations that have their source in 
the entrepreneurial spirit. Innovators are thus a kind of temporary monopolists, because they 
can exploit their position until imitators copy their ideas (Dörfler, 2010). Schumpeter (1911), 
however, strictly differentiated between the inventor and the innovator: 
 ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ŚĞŶĐĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ from 
 ?ŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? Ɛ ůŽŶŐas they are not carried into practice, inventions are 
economically irrelevant. And to carry any improvement into effect is a task 
entirely different from inventing of it, and a task, moreover, requiring entirely 
different kind of aptitudes. Although entrepreneurs of course may be 
inventors just as they may be capitalists, they are inventors not by nature of 
their function but by coincidence and vice versa. Besides, the innovations 
which it is the function of the entrepreneur to carry out need not necessarily be 
ĂŶǇŝŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂƚĂůů ?(Schumpeter, 1911: 88-89). 
^ĐŚƵŵƉĞƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞŶƚŽƌand the innovator can be nicely linked to 
CsíkszentŵŝŚĄůǇŝ ?Ɛ dual flow between the field and the individual mentioned earlier, because 
both are needed to produce innovations. In other words, the field catches the idea of the 
inventor and co-produces the innovation by converting the idea into a new value by promoting 
it to the domain. Another way of arguing for a link between the extraordinary and creativity is 
the relation between creativity and domain knowledge. Here, Csíkszentmihályi draws two 
arrows between the individual and the domain. One goes from the domain to the individual 
signifying that the domain transfers knowledge to the individual. The other one goes from the 
individual to the domain signifying that the domain has accepted that the individual has 
created new knowledge that is valuable (i.e. that it is an innovation) and worth adopting. With 
regard to the link between domain and individual, Einstein (1956) stressed that even if the 
individual inherits some knowledge from the domain, the actual knowledge always originates 
in the mind of the individual. Prietula and Simon (1998) also talk about the extraordinary, but 
use the term expert. For them expertise goes far beyond just knowing a multitude of facts. In 
other words, they see a difference between people who know a myriad of facts and those few 
extraordinary individuals who can use their knowledge beyond the borders of reasoning to 
create new creative solutions. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, for example, said that you can 
often hear amateur painters saying that their work is not finished yet. Goethe argued that they 
will never be finished, because they paint without awareness. The extraordinary or the master, 
on the other hand, knows from the first stroke what the final painting will look like (Goethe 
cited in Senge et al., 1999: 157). 'ŽĞƚŚĞ ?Ɛ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ
between amateur and extraordinary is the degree of awareness. By referring to 
ƐşŬƐǌĞŶƚŵŝŚĄůǇŝ ?ƐŵŽĚĞů ? ƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇĐƌĞĂƚŽƌŚĂƐĂ ĚĞĞƉĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ 
about the knowledge, values, tools and practices of the domain. Without this awareness a 
creation would have only a small chance to get accepted by the domain. Based on this train of 
thought we can now summarize that in order to create an innovation it needs an extraordinary 
person who is able to cope with the balancing act of using their knowledge beyond the borders 
of reasoning to create new creative solutions and being aware of the rules, knowledge, tools, 
practices and values of the domain. Now we are going to outline how a new idea is validated 
and how a new value is created. 
Idea Validation and Value Creation 
There is much disagreement about what qualifies a creation to be creative. This disagreement 
is certainly linked with the problem that the creative process itself (i.e. the process of coming 
up with a new idea) is unknown. One could argue that  ?ďĞŝŶŐ ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ ? could also mean to come 
up with ideas that are widely considered  ?ƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ? as long as the inventor went through a 
recognizable creative process. The Japanese Kenji Kawakami created the art of inventing 
objects that are practically useless by virtue of their disproportionate usefulness. He called his 
art chindogu. Zizek (2008) explains that chindogu objects must meet two criteria: they must 
be feasible to build, but they should be impractical in the sense that they cannot be marketed, 
because they would never receive the consent of the gatekeepers of the field to enter the 
domain. Consequently, the only possibility to judge whether an idea is creative or not, is to judge 
the value of the outcome of creativity. Amabile (1988; 1996) and George (2007) define 
creativity as the creation of ideas that are both new and useful. In other words, there is a clear 
distinction between the creation of ideas and the creation of values. First, an idea is created, 
which, abstractly seen is always new knowledge, which is needed to solve the ill-structured 
problem. Only then can the new idea be pitched and transferred into a new value. If there is 
only a new idea and no value creation, the idea remains unknown, which means that the idea 
needs to be passed on by the value. The management literature speaks in this respect of the 
perceived newness or degree of innovativeness of the idea. Some authors formulate that an 
idea is creative when it is new and valuable and it is innovative when the idea has become 
realized. Others propose that the newness has to be validated in relation to the firm or market. 
Many years ago Zaltman, Duncan and Holbeck (1973) have introduced a broader concept of 
perceived newness, which they called relevant units of adoption. They argued that newness is 
context specific and evaluated along continua that describe the quality of newness. Of essence 
is that both the individual creator and the field require knowledge in order to produce an 
innovation and to validate its value. Hence, a person that aims at altering or changing a 
domain by his/her idea must convince the field of the value of the idea. The tricky thing with 
new ideas is that it is difficult to judge beforehand how new and valuable they will be 
perceived. Rogers (1962) introduced the concept of diffusion of innovations, which is the 
planned, but also spontaneous spread of ideas. Diffusion is a type of communication of new 
ideas, which, because the idea is new, involves uncertainty. Rogers (1962: 6) describes this 
uncertainty as  ?ƚŚĞ degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived with respect to the 
occurrence of an event and the relative probability of these ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?Hence, information 
is used to overcome the lack of structure and predictability implied in uncertainty, because it is 
important that innovations are understood by the members of the field and domain. 
Understanding helps to limit the perceived risk and uncertainty. If a new idea is diffused and 
gets either adopted or rejected, this leads to a change in the social system. Consequently, 
whether a new idea becomes an innovation depends on the one hand how rule-breaking the 
idea is and on the other how compatible it is with the value system of the relevant unit of 
adoption. Innovations may disturb the sense-making of the domain and this is why innovation 
is often seen as dangerous, because it requires space and freedom from direction and control. 
In other words, the culture of the domain tends to remunerate individuals for their conformity 
and tends to punish those who challenge its culture. Let us discuss this two-way influence 
between the domain and its gatekeepers (i.e. field) and the individual by means of the concept 
of value systems. According to von Bertalanffy (1981: 13)  ?ǀĂůƵĞƐĂƌĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŽƌĂĐƚƐǁŚŝĐŚare 
chosen by and are ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞƚŽĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽƌƚŽƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨƌĂŵĞŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?
This means people within a value system are concerned with what is good and what is bad. 
Our individual value system can be described as muddled, because in the course of our lives, 
due to many different events, we change or reject values or adopt new ones. On the other hand, 
the value system of a domain is born from complex interactions of the value systems of its 
individual members and from the influence of other domains. The interesting thing is, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ is formed, it becomes independent of its 
members. This phenomenon can be explained by Hamel ĂŶĚ WƌĂŚĂůĂĚ ?Ɛ (1994: 55-56) story 
about a group of monkeys. A number of monkeys were put in a cage. In the middle of this cage 
was a pole and at the top of this pole were bananas. As soon as the monkeys tried to get up 
to the bananas they received a cold shower. Now, the interesting part is that the monkeys very 
quickly learned not to go up the pole to get the bananas, because they would get a cold 
shower, which they obviously did not like. Later, all the monkeys were re-placed one by one and 
still no new monkey touched the bananas, because it became part of their group value system 
ĂŶĚĞĂĐŚŶĞǁŵŽŶŬĞǇǁĂƐ “ƚŽůĚ ?ŶŽƚ to get the bananas. Again, we have shown that there is a 
difference between the perception of an individual and the perception of others. Therefore, 
it became now even clearer that there can be no method to make other people positively 
validate an idea and transform it into a new value. Now we are going back to creativity itself, 
which we have shown is a prerequisite for innovation, to explain its anti-methodological 
character. 
NO METHODS ALLOWED 
As a professional anarchist, Feyerabend (1987, 1993) rejects the use of any methods, as he 
observes that there is absolutely nothing that is present in all creativity but is absent in all other 
enterprises. Thus he declares that  ?ŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŐŽĞƐ ? ?In his various books de Bono describes 
creativity as unexpected, non-linear, non-algorithmic, anti-methodical mode of thinking. This 
is what he calls lateral thinking to contrast it to convergent thinking, or parallel thinking to 
contrast it with vertical thinking. Yet, he offers a series of tools (used when needed) and habits 
(always present) for lateral thinking. Let us look at what these methods really do: de Bono (1973) 
ŽĨĨĞƌƐĂǁŽƌĚ ? “WK ? ?that goes beyond the true-ĨĂůƐĞĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇ ?ƚŚĞ “^ŝǆdŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ,ĂƚƐ ?(de 
Bono, 1990) represent roles that can be used in brainstorming; the  “&ŽĐƵƐ ĂŶĚWƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? keeps 
one from forgetting the purpose; in ƚŚĞ “&ŽƌǁĂƌĚĂŶĚ WĂƌĂůůĞů ? the forward thinking is a step-
by-step inference along the path and the parallel thinking makes one stop and look around; the 
 “WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ>ŽŐŝĐ ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐ is usually all right, but the perception should 
be improved for better outcomes; the  “sĂůƵĞƐ ?serve as the basis for rejecting a logically 
correct solution, thus one should pay attention to what values are involved and who are 
affected by ƚŚĞŵ ?ƚŚĞ  “KƵƚĐŽŵĞĂŶĚŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƌĞĂďŽƵƚŶŽƚĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ to consider the 
implications; the  “ŝŵƐ ?'ŽĂůƐĂŶĚKďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?'K ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇĂŝŵƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ forgetting any of 
them; the  “ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ůů &ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? (CAF) suggests thoroughness instead of quick recipes; the 
 “KƚŚĞƌ WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ sŝĞǁƐ ? (OPV) emphasises open-mindedness through considering who is 
affected (it can be considered a version of the stakeholder analysis); the  “ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?
WŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚŚŽŝĐĞƐ ?  ?W ?ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞƐďŽƚŚĞǆƉůŽƌŝng and constructing alternatives; the 
 “&ŝƌƐƚ/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚWƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?&/W ?ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƐĞůĞĐƚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚ really matters; the  “ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ 
and ^ ĞƋƵĞů ?(C&S) urges exploring the consequences of the alternative actions; and finally the 
 “WůƵƐ ?DŝŶƵƐĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ? (PMI) is an assessment tool (de Bono, 1993: 63-150). Is this not 
infuriating? Why would someone who obviously understands the essence of creativity offer 
methods for it? Using Feyerabend we could say that anything goes but what you would 
normally do. These methods do not aim at making the creative process happen but rather at 
preventing us using the methods that we learned so well. De ŽŶŽ ?Ɛpoint is that we are so 
badly brainwashed that we would use the learned methods even subconsciously. Therefore his 
methods should not be seen as methods for creativity but rather as methods against non-
creativity. Methods against methods. 
Let us look closer at the example of PO. As mentioned above, de Bono (1973) offers PO as a 
word that goes beyond the true-false dichotomy. It is so to say the opposite of NO and NOT, 
without meaning YES. The essence of vertical or logical thinking is to make a selection by either 
accepting or rejecting something. As soon as we learn when to say no, we have learned how 
to use logical thinking. Or, as de Bono (1973: 196) says:  ?>ŽŐŝĐ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ EK ? ?In contrast, lateral thinking can be explained as a restructuring and 
rearrangement of information that helps us to break out from rigid patterns we have learned 
from experience. To break out from these patterns de Bono offers the use of the word PO and 
therefore describes lateral thinking as the management of PO. Of course, both NO and PO are 
language tools, but they have totally different functions. By saying NO we give a judgment, 
whereas by saying PO we are anti-judgmental. By saying NO we think within our learned 
framework of reasoning, whereas by saying PO we think outside our framework. But how does 
PO work? As earlier said, PO is, like NO, a language tool, but one that we are not used to. 
Therefore, it can help us to break out from the safe and familiar environment of our language 
and way of thinking. We just do not use the word PO on a daily basis and thus we are not used 
to it. Because we are not used to PO, it can help our mind put together information in new 
ways even if these new arrangements of information are unjustified. In other words, PO can 
help liberate us from our mind by disrupting our established patterns of thinking. This means 
that we have in addition to the selective options of YES and NO used in logical thinking also the 
option of PO, which allows us to select, or better accept, an option that might seem totally 
illogical and even absurd. Let us refer here to an example given by de Bono (1971: 205-206). He 
provides the following statement to explain the use of PO:  ?WKǁĂƚĞƌĨůŽǁƐƵƉŚŝůů if it is colored 
ŐƌĞĞŶ ? ?Most of us would probably say:  “EK ?water never flows uphill if it is colored green. In 
fact, water will never flow ƵƉŚŝůů ? ?But water can flow uphill. By adding a tiny amount of a 
particular sort of plastic, the water solidifies slightly with the effect that when we pour out this 
plastic-water mixture from a jug and then again hold the jug upright the water continues to 
flow out by climbing up the sidewalls of the jug. Is this not incredible? De Bono further suggests 
understanding the response to PO before we actually use PO. Why is that? In our common form 
of communication, when we use vertical thinking, we always give selective judgments about 
another ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ statement. In other words, we either agree or disagree with what the other 
person has said. The same will happen when beginners try to use the word PO. We are so 
indoctrinated by the selective mechanisms of our language that we think the PO-statement is 
also a judgment. But it is not. This is the very essence of PO. Maybe it is helpful to picture PO as a 
sticky tape with which we can tape those possibilities that we would normally reject as being 
completely irrelevant, useless, illogical or impossible to realise. However, this does not imply 
that the PO-statement is a better alternative or even an alternative at all. In this sense PO is 
never judgmental and therefore it is a protection that allows following new ways and that can 
help us to use information in a provocative way. Moreover, PO can bring relaxation in 
situations where we stuck in the rigidity of thinking. It can make us smile, because we can 
formulate seemingly alien possibilities that seem so absurd that they can help us break the 
rigidity to see the problem from a different angle from which we might easier grasp a solution. 
CONCLUSION 
At the beginning we asked whether there are steps that, when followed, lead not only to a 
new idea (i.e. creativity), but also to a successful idea (i.e. innovation). We argued that there 
are no such steps, but that there are methods against methods that can help the creative 
individual to step faster and easier into a state of mind that is conducive to creativity. Then 
we identified a number of reasons why some people think that such steps exist. The first reason 
is that academia has created a preference for seeing innovation as a continuous, rational, and 
purposive process, because the fuzzy aspects of creativity are difficult to validate and cannot 
result in testable explanations, predictions, and correspondence. The second reason is that 
many academics close creativity into a black box or run around in circles trying to blueprint the 
creative process. We see this is as a problem, because on the one hand we cannot ignore that 
creativity is a prerequisite for innovation, but on the other hand we have to accept that 
nobody knows how creativity works. The only possibility that remains is therefore to come as 
close as possible to the phenomenon of creativity. The third reason is connected to the 
creative individual. Academia tends to assume that everyone can be creative and often rejects 
that a truly creative idea requires an extraordinary mind. This has probably created the 
strongest belief that steps exist that, when followed, bring us to the novum. In order to 
support these earlier mentioned reasons, we discussed the systemic character of creativity 
and innovation by particularly focusing on the link between creativity and innovation, the 
creatives, and how ideas are validated and how new values are created. Based on this 
discussion we concluded that creativity, and for that matter innovation, does not allow for 
methods. In other words, there are no methods for creativity, but methods against non-
creativity. This claim was further supported by particularly focusing on ƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚ  “WK ?ĂƐ
proposed by de Bono. 
In this paper we outlined our particular view of creativity and innovation, more specifically 
one aspect of this view  ? our view on the impossibility of methods for creativity and innovation. 
This is a necessarily one-sided and limited view; but rather than providing a shallow and more 
inclusive overview of a topic we chose to immerse more deeply in this narrow interpretation. 
Our aim was not to convince the readers that our view is correct (let alone the only possible 
correct one) but to make them think more deeply about their own view of creativity and 
innovation. This is why we did not address areas that would be necessary for a more 
comprehensive discussion, such as the levels or types of creativity and especially the particular 
techniques/methods aimed at creativity and innovation. 
There are also topics in this chapter that we marginally discussed, only to the extent needed 
for our present theme, some of which may be candidates for future research. Particularly we 
plan to engage more deeply into the social aspects of creativity and innovation including the 
questions of responsibility. We have further plans to research various aspects of creativity. In a 
project that we completed, Marc interviewed 19 of the greatest chefs in the world. In another, 
presently ongoing project, Viktor interviewed so far 15 grandmasters (people at the highest 
knowledge level), including 12 Nobel Laureates. We have further plans to carry out similar 
research projects in various creative industries. The rich qualitative data that we are collecting 
will be analysed in the framework outlined in this chapter. 
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